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JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court is based on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)0)(2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Stewart's disagrees with the statement of issues set forth in Schaerrer's 
Brief, and also disagrees with the standard of review asserted by Schaerrer as being 
applicable to Schaerrer's issue no. 1. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1), Utah R. App. 
P., Stewart's submits a separate statement of issues. 
ISSUE PRESENTED BY SCHAERRER'S APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that if a defendant is subject 
to strict product liability only as a result of being in the chain of distribution of a product, 
then that defendant is entitled to indemnification from upstream suppliers of the defective 
product? 
Standard of Review: "A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness." Gerbich v. Newmed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1999). 
ISSUE PRESENTED BY STEWART'S CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court correctly determine that Stewart's was not entitled 
to immunity from claims of strict product liability? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's legal conclusions are afforded no 
deference, and are reviewed for correctness. Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 
P.2dll69, 1171 (Utah 1991). 
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Issue Preserved: Stewart's Cross-Appeal was preserved in its Notice of 
Cross-Appeal which identified the ruling of the trial court dated September 1, 2000, 
denying summary judgment. (Notice of Cross Appeal, Record at 1170; Trial Court's 
Ruling Denying Summary Judgment, Record at 1008, Addendum ("Add.") tab 1.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUES, ETC., DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Plaintiff Jeannie Schaerrer asserted that she was entitled to recover damages 
for injuries resulting from an allegedly defective drag - fenfluramine. While Schaerrer's 
Complaint alleges many causes of action against defendant Stewart's, following 
discovery it was clear that the only claim supported by evidence was a strict product 
liability claim based upon Stewart's sale (pursuant to a valid prescription) of the drug 
fenfluramine to Schaerrer. (See Memorandum Decision of Judge James Taylor dated 
October 18, 2000, at Record 1058 and attached at Add. tab 2; and Add. tab 3, Findings of 
Fact No. 2.) 
H. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Schaerrer's appeal and Stewart's cross-appeal relate to three motions and 
three rulings of the trial court. First, Stewart's moved for summary judgment on or about 
May 12, 2000. (Record at 594.) The court denied Stewart's motion for summary 
judgment and it is that denial that forms the basis of Stewart's Cross-Appeal. (Record at 
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1008, Add. tab 1.) Second, following the denial of Stewart's motion for summary 
judgment, the court reconsidered its ruling and granted Stewart's partial summary 
judgment. (Add. tab 2.) That ruling is not the subject of an appeal, but it unequivocally 
establishes certain facts hereinafter identified as important to an understanding of this 
case. 
Third, on November 29, 2000, Stewart's filed another Motion for Summary 
Judgment, based in part on the findings of the court with respect to Stewart's first motion 
for summary judgment. This time, the motion was granted. The court issued findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and entered final judgment in Stewart's favor. (Record at 1153-
1161, Add. tab 3.) This appeal followed. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the summer of 1995, Jeanne Schaerrer began taking the drugs 
phentermine and fenfluramine to lose weight. The drugs were prescribed by her 
physician, Dr. Jeffrey Johnson (a defendant) and purchased from Woolsey Pharmacy (not 
a defendant). (Record at 644-660, Dr. Johnson's records; Record at 619, 642, Woosley 
Pharmacy records.) On November 2, 1996, Schaerrer, for the first time, presented to 
Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy a prescription written by Dr. Johnson. The prescription called 
for 15 capsules, with each capsule to contain 20 milligrams of the drug phentermine and 
60 milligrams of the drug fenfluramine, to be taken once daily. (Record at 617, Dr. 
Johnson's actual prescription; Record at 703, Deposition testimony of Schaerrer.) The 
prescription written by Dr. Johnson was filled by Stewart Koeven, a pharmacist and 
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proprietor of Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy (hereinafter collectively "Stewart's") by 
combining the drug fenfluramine, purchased by Stewart's from defendant PCCA, and the 
drug phentermine, purchased by Stewart's from several sources, in a single capsule. 
{Record at 693, Deposition testimony of Stewart Koeven.) 
Over the next six months, concluding on June 16, 1997, Dr. Johnson wrote 
four additional prescriptions for Jeanne Schaerrer to receive additional amounts of 
phentermine and fenfluramine combined into a single capsule. {Record at 616-613, 
Dr. Johnson prescriptions.) Each prescriptions was filled by Stewart Koeven by 
combining fenfluramine purchased from PCCA, with phentermine purchased from a 
variety of sources. {Record at 693, Deposition testimony of Stewart Koeven.) Sometime 
before mid-July of 1997, Mrs. Schaerrer ceased taking fenfluramine. {Record at 699, 
Deposition of Jeanne Schaerrer.) 
Stewart's did not make or create either drug. Rather, Stewart's merely 
combined the already manufactured drugs in a single capsule. (Id). The unchallenged 
ruling of the trial court establishes that combining the drugs did not render either drug 
more dangerous than if taken separately. In fact, Schaerrer conceded this point. (Add. 
tab 2; Add. tab 3, finding of fact no. 2.) The injuries of the plaintiff cannot be attributed 
to combining the drugs. (Id) 
On or about February 8, 1999, Stewart's filed a Cross-Claim against co-
defendant PCCA, from whom Stewart's acquired all of the fenfluramine that was 
purchased from Stewart's by Schaerrer. The Cross-Claim asserted a right of common-
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law indemnification against PCCA based upon the well-established traditional concept 
that all entities in the chain of distribution of an allegedly defective product may obtain 
indemnification from those up the chain of distribution, ending ultimately with the 
product manufacturer.1 In its Finding of Fact dated April 30, 2001, the court found that 
Stewart's Cross-Claim against defendant PCCA sought common-law indemnification: "in 
the event that the fenfluramine supplied by PCCA to Stewart's was determined to be 
defective." (Add. tab 3, f^ 7 of the court's Findings of Fact.) This fact does not appear to 
be disputed by Schaerrer. 
On or about January 19, 2000, Schaerrer entered a Release and Settlement 
Agreement with defendant PCCA. In pertinent part, the Release provided that not only 
was PCCA released from all claims, but that Schaerrer also waived her right to recover 
from any party that could obtain indemnification from PCCA for liability arising from 
her claims. (Add. tab 3, Findings of Fact, 6, 7, and 8.) 
On April 30, 2001, the court granted Stewart's second Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The court found that as a matter of law: if Schaerrer recovered on her only 
remaining claim - that of strict product liability - against Stewart's, then Stewart's would 
be able to obtain indemnity from PCCA for all such liability. Rather than requiring all of 
the parties to go to the time and expense of a trial and subsequent action between 
1
 For reasons unknown to Stewart's, Stewart's Answer and Cross-Claim, which 
should appear in the record at p. 71, is gone. In its place there is a handwritten note 
created by Carma B. Smith, clerk deputy of the Fourth Judicial District Court, stating that 
the Answer and Cross-Claim are gone, but offering no explanation. {Record at p. 71.) 
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Stewart's and PCCA regarding the right of indemnity, the court concluded that even if 
Schaerrer prevailed, she would have to waive her right to recovery based upon the 
unambiguous language of the Release she executed with PCCA. If Schaerrer prevailed 
against Stewart's, PCCA's obligation to indemnify Stewart's would be triggered, and 
once triggered, Schaerrer was required by the Release to waive her right to recover from 
Stewart's. (Add. tab 3, pp. 5-7 of the court's Conclusions of Law.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary of Argument Applicable to Schaerrer's Appeal. 
The findings of fact made by the trial court on April 30, 2001 should be 
entirely accepted by this Court because there has been no appropriate challenge to such 
findings. Schaerrer has not identified a challenge to such findings in her brief, and in any 
event, has failed to meet the marshaling of evidence requirement to make such a 
challenge. 
These findings of fact, along with the trial court's unchallenged earlier 
findings when granting partial summary judgment to Stewart's, establish the correctness 
of the court's eventual ruling granting complete summary judgment to Stewart's. Where 
plaintiff concedes that a defendant's conduct did not materially alter a product claimed to 
be effective, then that defendant is entitled to indemnification from those who supplied 
the product to the defendant. This well established principle was not altered by the Utah 
Liability Reform Act. 
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Summary of Argument Regarding Stewart's Cross-Appeal 
Traditionally, pharmacists have been considered immune from claims of 
strict product liability when they fill a valid prescription for a drug, and the pharmacist 
does not alter the drug in any material way. Stewart's raised this immunity to Schaerrer's 
claims. The trial court rejected this argument based upon the chance that a jury could 
conclude that Stewart's was a "manufacturer" and not a "pharmacist" because Stewart's 
combined phentermine with fenfluramine in a single capsule. Stewart's contends that the 
trial court exalted form over substance. While Stewart's activities combining 
fenfluramine and phentermine in a capsule might be considered by a jury to be consistent 
with the activities of a manufacturer, those activities have nothing to do with this case. 
There is no evidence that the combining of phentermine and fenfluramine altered the 
fenfluramine consumed by Jeanne Schaerrer in any way. There is no evidence that 
Stewart's "manufacturing" activities caused injury. It was Stewart's role as pharmacist (a 
seller of drugs prescribed by physicians) that formed the basis of Schaerrer's claims and 
as a pharmacist, Stewart's is immune from Schaerrer's claims. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE UNCHALLENGED. 
The trial court's findings of fact (Add. tab 3) should be accepted by this 
Court as controlling for this appeal. Schaerrer has not identified a challenge to such 
findings of fact in her brief, and has made no effort to marshal the evidence that would 
-8-
support the findings of fact. In the absence of appropriate marshaling of the evidence, the 
trial court's findings of fact should be accepted as controlling by this Court. Hales Sand 
& Gravel v. Audit Div., 842 P.2d 887, 893 (Utah 1992); Christensen v. Monns, 812 P.2d 
69, 72 (Utah 1991); Rule 24(a)(9), Utah RApp.P. The trial court's findings in its 
memorandum decision of October 18, 2000 should also be accepted as controlling 
because those findings are not the subject of Schaerrer's appeal. (Record at 1163, 1164, 
Schaerrer's Notice of Appeal.) 
Each of the trial court's findings of fact are significant. For example, the 
trial court found that Stewart's had asserted an effective claim against PCCA for strict 
product liability common-law indemnification, and that the validity of the Release 
executed by plaintiff, including the provision relied upon by the court to grant summary 
judgment to Stewart's, was unchallenged. The trial court found that: "No evidence was 
submitted to the court to suggest that the terms of the PCCA Release should not be 
enforced according to the ordinary meaning of its plain and unambiguous terms." (Add. 
tab 3, Tj 8, Findings of Fact.) According to those plain terms, if Stewart's is entitled to 
indemnification from PCCA, Schaerrer waived her right to recover from Stewart's. This 
point is established and uncontested. Further, the court found that Stewart's so-called 
"manufacturing" activities did not cause Schaerrer's injuries and Schaerrer conceded this 
point. (Add. tab 2; tab 3, Finding of Fact no. 2.) 
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POINT n 
STEWART'S IS ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION FROM PCCA. 
A. The Limited Nature of Stewart's Liability. 
In this case, the trial court's unchallenged finding is that Stewart's did 
nothing that caused plaintiff injury except sell her fenfluramine. There is no evidence in 
this case that a breach of the standard of care by Stewart's caused injury. There is no 
evidence in this case that the combining of fenfluramine with phentermine caused injury. 
There is no evidence that Stewart's so-called marketing efforts caused Schaerrer's 
injuries. There is no evidence that Stewart's lack of warnings regarding the one-a-day 
capsule caused injury. There is no evidence that Stewart's altered in any material way 
the fenfluramine that it purchased from PCCA. The fenfluramine supplied by Stewart's 
was in no way more dangerous or more likely to cause injury than was the fenfluramine 
supplied to plaintiff by anyone else. (Add. tab 3, trial court's Findings of Fact.) The only 
claim that plaintiff had against Stewart's which was supported by evidence was the claim 
that Stewart's should be strictly liable purely because of Stewart's presence in the chain 
of distribution of fenfluramine. It is only because the doctrine of strict product liability 
allows plaintiff to recover from every entity within the chain of distribution that plaintiff 
has a claim against Stewart's. No other claims were supported by evidence of causation. 
(Add. tab 3, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment; and Memorandum 
Decision Add. tab 2.) 
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B. Stewart's is Liable, if at all, Only Because Everyone in the Chain of 
Distribution Is Jointly Strictly Liable. 
Even though joint and several liability was generally eliminated by the Utah 
Tort Reform Act in 1986,2 when a plaintiff asserts a claim of strict product liability, 
everyone in the chain of distribution of the allegedly defective product is jointly liable 
with everyone else in the chain of distribution for injuries caused by the product. See 
Restatement (Third) Torts, § 1, and comments b through e; Restatement (Second) Torts, § 
402A(1) and comment f. 
Historically, the reason that everyone, from the manufacturer who created 
the defective product, to the retail seller entirely ignorant of the product's defect, was 
liable for 100 percent of plaintiffs injuries is that the injured party may have no 
connection or contact with anyone other than the entity from whom the product was 
purchased and the injured party must rely upon the retail seller for an assurance of safety. 
Id Sellers are liable for defective products sold "even though [the seller] has exercised 
all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product." Restatement (Second) Torts, 
§ 402A, comment a. Without this traditional doctrine of joint liability, Jeanne Schaerrer 
would have no claim against Stewart's in this case. She has no evidence to support any 
other claim. All of her other claims based upon Stewart's alleged manufacturing activity, 
2
 Joint and several liability was eliminated in Utah with the adoption of the Utah 
Liability Reform Act, U.C.A. § 78-27-38 (1986); most other states have likewise 
eliminated joint and several liability and have adopted a comparative responsibility 
approach of one form or another. See Restatement (Third) Torts, § 23 Contribution, 
Reporter's Note comment e, and the cases collected. 
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fail because of a lack of causation evidence. No evidence was submitted to the trial 
court, and none exists, that anything that Stewart's did or didn't do, however that conduct 
might be characterized, caused Jeanne Schaerrer's injures except that Stewart's sold 
fenfluramine to Jeanne Schaerrer.3 
C. Upstream Indemnification Is a Necessary Element of Strict Products Liability 
Historically, everyone downstream (assemblers, wholesalers, retailers) from 
the original producer of a defective product has been entitled to obtain indemnification 
from everyone upstream. This principle strikes an appropriate balance between providing 
the injured party with the opportunity for recovery from anyone in the chain of 
distribution, and still allowing those in the chain of distribution to pass liability up the 
chain towards entities best able to eliminate defects.4 The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
concisely explained this principle in Promaulayko v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 562 
A.2d 202 (N.J. 1989). The court stated: 
This approach is consistent also with the principle of focusing 
on the defective product as it proceeds down the chain of 
distribution. In general, the effect of requiring the party 
closest to the original producer to indemnify parties farther 
down the chain is to shift the risk of loss to the most efficient 
accident avoider. (citations omitted.) Passing the cost of risk 
up the distributive chain also fulfills, as a general rule, the 
goal of distributing the risk to the party best able to bear it. 
3
 Of course, there are exceptions to the principle that liability extends to everyone in the 
chain of distribution. One of those exceptions would apply if the fact-finder in this case 
determined that Stewart's is a pharmacist, and not a manufacturer. Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, 
Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1387-1388 (Pa. 1991) (and the many cases cited therein). 
4
 Though Schaerrer voluntarily waived that right in this case. 
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Id. at 206. It is "well settled" that this same principle allows a downstream manufacturer 
who incorporates, by assembly or otherwise, a defective component part into a finished 
product to obtain indemnification from the suppliers of the defective component. See 
Rowland Truck Equip. Inc. v. Everwear Prod, Inc., 468 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1985) wherein 
the court stated: 
The law is well settled that when a manufacturer of a finished 
product is held strictly liable for damages caused to a third 
person by a defective component part that was purchased 
from a supplier and integrated into the finished product, the 
said manufacturer is entitled to recover indemnity from the 
party supplying the defective component part, provided the 
manufacturer was not himself negligent in either creating or 
failing to discover the defect. 
Id. at 394; Jones v. Arrow Chem., 680 F.Supp. 338, 340 (D. Mont. 1987); Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co. v. Reeves, 486 So.2d 374, 379 n. 4 (Miss. 1986); Kicklighter v. Nails By 
Janai, Inc., 616 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir. 1980); American Jurisprudence 2d at Vol. 63B, 
Products Liability, § 1748 (1997). 
Therefore, if Schaerrer proved that fenfluramine is defective, then Stewart's 
would be entitled to indemnification from PCCA because PCCA supplied to Stewart's a 
defective component part; i.e., fenfluramine. 
In response to these well established principles, plaintiff raises two 
arguments. 
First, plaintiff argues that upstream indemnification is not available in Utah 
because the Liability Reform Act "eliminated the need for . . . indemnity." (Schaerrer's 
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Brief beginning at p. 15.) Plaintiff's argument proves too much. Indemnification in the 
context of a strict product liability claim arose because those farther down the chain of 
distribution are considered just as liable to the injured party as those up the chain of 
distribution. Without that concept, plaintiff has no claim against Stewart's. If the Utah 
Liability Reform Act eliminated this joint chain of distribution liability, there would be 
no need for indemnification, but there would also be no legal basis for Schaerrer's claim 
against Stewart's. If, however, joint chain of distribution liability survived the enactment 
of the Utah Liability Reform Act, then chain of distribution indemnification must also 
survive the Liability Reform Act. The exact same reasons which led courts to 
acknowledge chain of distribution indemnification before the elimination of joint and 
several liability generally, are still just as applicable because the elimination of joint and 
several liability did not eliminate joint chain of distribution liability. This simple 
proposition has led courts to uniformly reject the argument Schaerrer is asserting before 
this Court. Degener v. Hall Contracting Corp., 27 S.W.3d 775, 780 (Kent. 2000); 
Rotono v. Access Indus. Inc., 26 Conn.L.Rptr., 274, 2000 WestLaw 151231 (Conn. 
2000); Horowitz v. Schneider Nat % Inc., 992 F.2d 279, 280-81 (10th Cir. 1993). This 
Court should likewise reject Schaerrer's argument. 
Furthermore, Schaerrer's suggestion that the jury's ability to apportion fault 
between Stewart's and PCCA is a substitute for indemnification simply doesn't make 
sense in light of the underlying principles of strict product liability. Assuming Schaerrer 
could establish a defect, both PCCA and Stewart's are one hundred percent liable for 
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plaintiffs injuries because they were both in the chain of distribution. The liability of 
both PCCA and Stewart's occurs by operation of law and it is, in practical effect, joint 
and several. The jury, given the available evidence, would have no basis to apportion 
fault between PCCA and Stewart's. Even if this could somehow be accomplished, 
whatever percentage of fault was assigned to Stewart's would still trigger PCCA's 
indemnification obligation. 
Schaerrer's second argument is that even if indemnification exists, it should 
not exist in this case. To support this argument plaintiff now asserts that Stewart's failure 
to warn of risks of the one-a-day phen-fen capsule or that Stewart's mis-marketing of this 
product or the fact that Stewart's role wasn't "passive" could support independent claims 
by Schaerrer against Stewart's. This argument overlooks the fact that Schaerrer conceded 
and the trial court's unchallenged ruling establishes that Stewart's did nothing to alter the 
drug in any way. There was absolutely no evidence presented to the trial court that either 
"failure to warn" or "mis-marketing" of the one-a-day phen-fen capsule caused injury. 
The trial court indisputably found that the "one-a-day phen-fen capsule" presented no 
greater risk of injury or harm than taking the drugs separately. Therefore, there can be no 
causal connection between a failure to warn of the risks of the one-a-day capsule, or mis-
marketing of the one-a-day capsule, or other "active" conduct and plaintiffs injuries. 
There can be no strict liability or other fault without causation. Burns v. Cannondale 
Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah App. 1984); Kent v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 930 
P.2d 904, 906 (Utah App. 1997); Fitz v. Synthes, 990 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1999). The 
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record contains no such evidence and therefore, those claims couldn't be submitted to the 
jury. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996). 
CONCLUSION 
(Schaerrer's Appeal) 
Stewart's respectfully urges this court to affirm the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment as described in the trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment. (Add. tab 3.) 
CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT I 
STEWART'S IS IMMUNE FROM SCHAERRER'S CLAIMS OF 
STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY, 
The issue presented by Stewart's Cross-Appeal appears to be a matter of 
first impression in the United States. Long-standing legal principles are, however, closely 
analogous. 
Traditionally, pharmacists have been considered immune from claims of 
strict product liability relating to alleged defects in the drugs they provide customers 
pursuant to prescriptions. See, Coyle v. Bonnet Lane Pharmacy, 584 A.2d 1383, 1387-
1388 (Pa. 1991). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thoroughly addressed the 
underpinnings of the historical immunity afforded pharmacists for alleged defects in 
prescription drugs. The court noted that pharmacists do not choose which drugs they 
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supply and therefore, pharmacists should neither be liable for defects in those drugs, nor 
should pharmacists be required to warn of the drugs' dangers. The role of choosing drugs 
and supplying information regarding those drugs is more properly served by physicians. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: 
Unlike the marketing system for most other products, the 
distribution system for prescription drugs is highly restricted. 
Pharmacists, as suppliers do not freely choose which products 
they will make available to consumers in any given instance, 
and patients, as consumers, do not freely choose which 
products to buy. Physicians exercising sound medical 
judgment act as intermediaries in the chain of distribution, 
preempting, as it were, the exercise of discretion by the 
supplier pharmacist and within limits, by the patient 
consumer. 
Id. at 1385. The court also noted that holding pharmacists strictly liable for defects in 
drugs would not serve the underlying purpose of strict product liability, that of improving 
the safety of products. The Pennsylvania Court reasoned that regardless of which drug is 
prescribed, the pharmacist is not: 
at liberty to substitute his judgment of the product's safety for 
the patient for that of the physician. Similarly, as to 
preventing the circulation of defective products, it would ill-
serve the needs of the public to impose a duty on pharmacists 
under which, to avoid potential liability, they might refuse to 
fill prescriptions . . . . 
Id. at 1386. See, also, Murphy v. E.R. Squid & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247, 249 (Calif. 
1985); Leesley v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758, 761-783 (111. App. 1988); Raynor v. Richards-
Merrill, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 238, 247 (D. D.C. 1986). Based upon the immunity 
established in the foregoing authority, Stewart's moved for summary judgment. 
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The trial court denied Stewart's motion because it identified an issue of fact 
which precluded summary judgment. The trial court concluded that a jury could find that 
Stewart's acted not exclusively as a pharmacist, but also acted as a manufacturer by 
combining phentermine and fenfluramine into a one-a-day product not otherwise 
available. Stewart's role as a manufacturer, the trial court reasoned, eliminated the 
pharmacist's immunity. (Add. tab 1.) 
Stewart's urges this Court to adopt a rule of law whereby a pharmacist who 
engages in some manufacturing activity (such as combining phentermine and 
fenfluramine in one capsule) still faces no strict product liability so long as the 
pharmacist's manufacturing activities are tangential and do not render the drug(s) any 
more dangerous than they otherwise would have been, and the drugs are supplied 
pursuant to a valid prescription by physician. It is undisputed that nothing Stewart's did 
in its role as a "manufacturer" altered the outcome of this case in any respect. Therefore, 
while Stewart's may be a "manufacturer" for the limited purpose of creating the one-a-
day phen-fen combination capsule, the reasons Stewart's faces strict product liability, if 
at all, has nothing to do with that manufacturing role. Stewart's faces strict products 
liability because it was in the chain of distribution of fenfluramine. As is applicable to 
this case, Stewart's role was no different than any other pharmacist filling a prescription 
and therefore, the traditional immunity afforded pharmacists from claims of strict product 
liability should still apply to Stewart's. 
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It is fenfluramine which is at the heart of plaintiff's case and with respect to 
fenfluramine, Stewart's role was simply that of a pharmacist: he purchased fenfluramine 
from a supplier, and provided it to the plaintiff, without material alteration, pursuant to a 
valid prescription. As such, he should be entitled to the same immunity afforded to all 
pharmacists. Schaerrer's right of recovery for strict liability should be limited to the drug 
manufacturer and wholesale supplier.5 
CONCLUSION 
Stewart's respectfully requests this Court to reverse the decision of the trial 
court and to enter judgment in Stewart's favor as a matter of law dismissing plaintiffs 
strict product liability claims. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ O ^ day of April, 2002. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
^v^^^ii^L, 
Michael P. Zapcheo 
Attorneys for Appellees/Cross-Appellants 
Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy 
5
 Of course, if Schaerrer could have established the elements of a negligence claim 
against Stewart's, she could recover on that basis. No evidence, however, establishes 
causation. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JEANNE SCHAERRER, 
Petitioner ORDER DENYING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
vs. Date: September 1, 2000 
PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING Case Number: 980406564 
CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC, et al, 
Respondents Division V: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy and Stewart 
Koeven's (Defendant Stewart) motion for summary judgment. The Utah Supreme Court has 
given the court the following guidelines for making a ruling of summary judgment: 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the [non-moving] party. Thus, the court must evaluate 
all the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Wilkinson v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co.. 975 P.2d 464,465 (Utah 1998) quoting Bowen v. Riverton Citv. 656 
P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). 
Additionally, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure contain this rule for making a ruling of 
summary judgment: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
The court will now recite the facts and inferences that it relies on according to the 
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aforementioned guidelines to make its decision to deny summary judgment for Defendants 
Stewart Koeven, and Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy. The Defendant pharmacist combined the 
prescribed fenfluramine with other substances: phentermine, which was prescribed, and a filler and 
a time-release agent which were not. Combination of these drugs into a single uone a day" 
capsule was the idea of the Defendant and was marketed by him to patients of local physicians by 
word of mouth. The court must assume, and Defendants concede that in considering this motion, 
defendants acted as a manufacturer.1 Defendants provided no warnings to the Plaintiffs physician 
about potential side effects, etc., for this new drug combination. Defendants could not have 
known without testing whether the fenfluramine would be released over a period of time as 
intended.2 For the purposes of this motion it is assumed that sufficient evidence is available to 
establish a causative link between the fenfluramine ingested by the Plaintiff and her physical 
ailment. 
The Plaintiff argues that because the Defendant pharmacist "manufactured" a new 
product, he is strictly liable to the Defendant for any harm as if he had originally manufactured the 
fenfluramine itself. The Defendant counters that since there is no evidence that the drug in 
capsulated combination with other ingredients caused any harm that would not have occurred 
from ingestion in the fashion expected by the primary supplier of fenfluramine, the general 
exclusion of pharmacists from theories of strict liability applicable to a manufacturer of the drug 
should apply in this case. The earliest case that the court can find that exempts a pharmacist from 
1
 See quotation of Statutory definition and discussion infra. 
2
 See uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Wooley at page 12 of Plaintiffs Memo in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment. 
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strict liability is McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co.. 174 So2d 736 (Fla 1965). The original claim was 
one of implied warranty of fitness, but the Florida Supreme Court recognized that the action was 
also based on the concept of strict liability.3 The court noted that comment k4 of § 402A of the 
Restatement 2d of Torts provides for an exception to strict liability for pharmacists under these 
same conditions. The court also noted that applying strict liability to pharmacists would result in 
their becoming insurers of the safety of drugs manufactured by others.5 The Restatement of the 
Law Third, Torts-Product Liability § 6 (e) and comment h also recognize the pharmacy 
exception, noting a couple of exceptions: 
(e) A retail seller or other distributor of a prescription drug or medical device is 
subject to liability for harm caused by the drug or device if: 
(1) at the time of sale or other distribution the drug or medical device contains 
3
 McLeod at 739. 
4
 The court recognizes that courts have interpreted this comment in different ways. Here 
is the text of the comment: 
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of human 
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are 
especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur 
treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when 
it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the 
use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they 
involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is 
not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and 
the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the 
prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, 
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance 
of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the 
marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such 
products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper 
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate 
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an 
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk. 
5
 McLeod at 739. 
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a manufacturing defect as defined in § 2(a); or 
(2) at or before the time of sale or other distribution of the drug or medical 
device the retail seller or other distributor fails to exercise reasonable care and 
such failure causes harm to persons, 
h. Liability of retail seller of prescription drugs and medical devices for defective 
designs and defects due to inadequate instructions or warnings. The rule governing 
most products imposes liability on wholesalers and retailers for selling a defectively 
designed product, or one without adequate instructions or warnings, even though they 
have exercised reasonable care in marketing the product. See § 1, Comment e, and 
§ 2, Comment o. Courts have refused to apply this general rule to nonmanufacturing 
retail sellers of prescription drugs and medical devices and, instead, have adopted the 
rule stated in Subsection (e). That rule subjects retailers to liability only if the product 
contains a manufacturing defect or if the retailer fails to exercise reasonable care in 
connection with distribution of the drug or medical device. In so limiting the liability 
of intermediary parties, courts have held that they should be permitted to rely on the 
special expertise of manufacturers, prescribing and treating health-care providers, and 
governmental regulatory agencies. They have also emphasized the needs of medical 
patients to have ready access to prescription drugs at reasonable prices. 
The Covle case also cites the following cases as refusing to apply strict liability to 
pharmacists: Ravnorv. Richardson-Merrell. Inc.. 643 F.Supp. 238 (D.D.C.1986); Ramirez v. 
Richardson-Merrell. Inc.. 628 F.Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Murphv v. E.R. Squibb & Sons. 40 
CaL3d 672, 221 Cal.Rptr. 447, 710 P.2d 247 (1985); Ullman v. Grant 114 Misc.2d 220, 450 
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1982); Batiste v. American Home Products Corp., 32 N.C.App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269 
(1977); Bichlerv. Willing. 58 AX>.2d 331, 397 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977).* 
The Plaintiff argues that because the pharmacist stepped out of the traditional role of 
receiving and filling prescriptions he becomes strictly liable for harm that might result from the 
noxious substance. The burden of strict liability and the duty to warn of defects is placed upon 
manufacturers to encourage careful testing, research and warnings that precede or accompany the 
6
 Covle v. Richardson-Merrell Inc.. 584 A.2d 1383 (PA 1991) at 1387-1388. 
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product into the marketplace.7 The Pharmacist in this case wants the best of both worlds. He 
wants the economic profit from making a desirable product available for sale but wants to avoid 
the testing, research, and warning responsibility that generally attach to the introduction of a new 
product. The court cannot distinguish between the Defendant Stewart as a manufacturer and 
other named defendants, who are acknowledged manufacturers but who are not the manufacturers 
of the original fenfluramine powder. These other manufacturers merely purchased fenfluramine 
powder and put it into a pill or capsule form. They cannot escape liability under the doctrine of 
strict liability for manufacturers of defective or dangerous products and neither should Defendants 
Stewart if he acted as a manufacturer. 
No regulated or controlled substance is intended to be sold without an intervening 
physician's prescription. Nevertheless, a manufacturer may still be strictly liable for a dangerous 
or defective product. There simply is no good reason not to apply the same standards to this 
Defendant. There is evidence in this case from which a juiy could find that he stepped from 
behind the pharmacist's counter and became a manufacturer by creating and marketing a product 
not otherwise available. The Utah Code gives this definition of manufacturing, which appears to 
encompass what Defendant Stewart did: 
(22) "Manufacture": 
(a) means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, or 
processing of a prescription drug or a device, either directly or indirectly . . . and 
includes any packaging or repackaging of a substance or labeling or relabeling of its 
container; {U.C.A. 58-17a-102 (22). Definitions.} 
Something in the product appears to have had negative physical consequences. The pharmacist 
7
 For example see Covle v. Richardson-Merrell Inc.. 584 A.2d 1383 (PA 1991) at 1387, 
which states that strict liability provides an incentive to safety. 
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exception to the doctrines of strict liability and a manufacturer's duty to warn does not apply in 
this case. The motion for summary judgment is denied. 
Dated this 1* day of Septemb£L2000 
Copies of this Order mailed to: 
Counsel for the Petitioner: 
Counsel for the Respondent: 
Mailed this \ day of ^)ZJQA , 2000, postage pre-paid as noted above. 
A t u C L ^ 
Court Clerk 
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RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax:(801)532-5506 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Jeanne Schaerrer, : 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
Professional Compounding Centers 
of America, Inc., et aL 
Defendants 
Memorandum Decision 
Date: October 18,2000 
Case Number. 980406564 
Division V: Judge James R. Taylpr 
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Defendants Stewart Plara Pharmacy 
and Stewart Koeven, RJPltfor reconsideration/clarification. 
In the Plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 64 on page 19, she has alleged that combining 
phentermine, fenfluamine and a time-release agent in a single capsule "caused an even greater risk 
of unreasonable, dangerous side effects" than taking the drugs separately. During oral arguments 
it was stipulated that the Plaintiff had or would present no evidence that the combination of the 
drugs created a greater harm or danger than ingestion of the drugs separately. That oositioitts re-
affirmed in the Plaintiffs brief in opposition to tins motion on page one: "[tjhrough her counsel, 
Plaintiff has already stipulated on the record that she will not seek to introduce evidence that 
Stewart's compounded capsule cause increased risk of injury to her." Based upon that stipulation 
the Court finds that partial summary judgment, on that limited portion of the complaint is 
appropriate and should be granted. It is the intent ofthis Court to predude by ^ 
from the Plaintiff that the combination of the various drugs created amore serious risk of harm 
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than ingestion of the drags separately and any resultant damage attributable completely to that 
increased risk. Counsel for the Defendants is directed to prepare an appropriate order in 
accordance with Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Adminisbation. 
Dated this 18* day of Octobe%200pj&l 
Copies of this Order mailed to: 
Charles F.Abbott 
Scott Walker 
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Richard Heimann 
Richard M. Franco 
Embarcadero Center West 
275 Battery Street, 30* Floor 
San Francisco, California 84111-3339 
Camille N. Johnson 
Brian P. Miller 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Judge J^esRi^faylor /$. 
Fourtn Judicial District Court 
Craig N. Hentschel 
Michael EL Walker 
777FigueroaSt.44th 
Los Angeles, California 90017-5844 
Dennis Ferguson 
257 East 200 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael P. Zaccheo 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Flooi 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Mailed this _dayof_ , 2000, postage pre-paid as noted above. 
Court Clerk U 7 \ 3 
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MICHAEL P. ZACCHEO (A4450) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for DEFENDANTS STEWART PLAZA PHARMACY 
AND STEWART KOEVEN, R.PH. 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JEANNE SCHAERRER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PROFESSIONAL COMPOUNDING 
CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC., 
STEWART'S PLAZA PHARMACY, INC., 
STEWART KOEVEN, R.PH., JEFFREY W. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT 
(Proposed) 
Case No. 980406564 
JOHNSON, M.D., AMERICAN HOME 
PRODUCTS CORP., AH. ROBINS 
COMPANY, INCORPORATED, WYETH-
AYERST LABORATORIES COMPANY, 
INC., 
Defendants. 
Judge James Taylor 
On or about November 29, 2000, defendants Stewart's Plaza Pharmacy and 
Stewart Koeven (hereinafter "Stewart's"), by and through their counsel of record, Michael P. 
Zaccheo, RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON, submitted to the court a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities, along with certain exhibits. 
Thereafter, plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record, Richard M. Franco, LlEFF, 
CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP, and Charles F. Abbott, ABBOTT & WALKER, submitted 
a Memorandum in Opposition to Stewards Motion for Summary Judgment and Stewart's, by and 
through counsel,-submitted a Reply Memorandum. On Thursday, January 25, 2001, the court 
heard oral argument from Mr. Zaccheo on behalf of Stewart's, and Mr. Franco, on behalf of the 
plaintiff, regarding Stewart's Motion for Summary Judgment. After consideration of the parties' 
memoranda, oral argument, and applicable Utah law, the court enters the following Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment pursuant to Rules 52, and 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and Rule 4-504, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
Based upon the pleadings, the evidence submitted to the court by the parties, the 
admissions of counsel, and the court's prior findings, the court hereby finds that the following 
facts are uncontroverted and that no material issue of fact remains regarding the following: 
1. The plaintiff Jeanne Schaerrer on several occasions purchased the drug 
fenfluramine from defendant Stewart's. All of the fenfluramine supplied to Jeanne Schaerrer by 
Stewart's was purchased by Stewart's from defendant Professional Compounding Centers of 
America ("PCCA"). 
2. Stewart's combined the fenfluramine purchased from PCCA, with the drug 
phentermine and a time-release agent to create a one-a-day "phen-fen" capsule. It was in the form 
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of this capsule that Stewart's supplied fenfluramine to Jeanne Schaerrer. No evidence has been 
submitted to the court which would support an inference that the combining of fenfluramine, 
phentermine and a time-release agent in a single capsule altered or affected the fenfluramine in any 
way. No evidence has been submitted to the court that would support an inference that Stewart's 
altered, in any way material to this action, the fenfluramine that was purchased from PCCA and 
was ultimately consumed by the plaintiff. The fenfluramine supplied by Stewart's was in no way 
more dangerous or more likely to cause injury to the plaintiff than was fenfluramine supplied to 
the plaintiff by, for example, defendant American Home Products, which was not combined in a 
single capsule with phentermine or any other substance. This finding was also made by the court 
in connection with an earlier motion for summary judgment submitted by Stewart's and is 
reflected in the court's rulings of September 1, 2000, and October 18, 2000, denying Stewart's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and granting partial summary judgment, respectively. The court's 
Order of September 1, 2000, and the court's Order of October 18,2000, are both incorporated 
into these findings and conclusions as if fully set forth. 
3. Plaintiff has alleged in her Complaint that she sustained injury as a result of 
having ingested the drug fenfluramine and that Stewart's is liable based upon theories of 
negligence and strict products liability. Based upon the court's ruling of October 18,2000, 
plaintiffs only remaining cause of action against Stewart's is based upon strict product liability. 
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4. In this case, in order to recover based upon the theory of strict product 
liability, the jury would have to conclude that Stewart's was a manufacturer with regard to the 
fenfluramine supplied to the plaintiff. For purposes of these findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and judgment, the court has assumed that the jury would indeed conclude that Stewart's was a 
manufacturer. As a manufacturer, Stewart's would be liable for a defect, if any, in the drug 
fenfluramine which it supplied to the plaintiff 
5. For purposes of this motion, the court has assumed that the plaintiff would 
be able to meet her burden to establish that the drug fenfluramine was defective as that term is 
defined under Utah law for purposes of strict product liability. 
6. On or about January 19, 2000, the plaintiff executed a Release and 
Settlement Agreement with defendant PCCA. In pertinent part, the Release provided as follows: 
III. 
PLAINTIFF'S AGREEMENT AND WAIVER AS TO CLAIMS AGAINST PCCA 
FOR CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY 
(READ CAREFULLY) 
In exchange for the consideration paid to Plaintiff and as part of the 
Release granted to PCCA, Plaintiff specifically agrees that she will 
not seek to recover from PCCA any damages attributable to 
PCCA's proportionate share of fault, if any, which may be 
determined under the applicable provisions of the Utah Liability 
Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27, etseq. In addition, Plaintiff 
agrees that, to the extent that any party to the lawsuit or any other 
tort feasor, person, or entity obtains a final judgment against PCCA 
for contribution or indemnity for damage arising from the subject of 
this Lawsuit, Plaintiff waives her right to recover from said party, 
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tort feasor, person, or entity any damages up to and including the 
total amount of the judgment against PCCA for indemnity. Plaintiff 
further agrees subject to approval of the court, that PCCA need not 
participate further in defense of itself in this action, even for the 
purpose of having fault and/or indemnity determined. 
7. On or about February 8, 1999, Stewart's filed a Cross-Claim against 
defendant PCCA. The Cross-Claim asserted that Stewart's had a right of common-law 
indemnification against PCCA in the event that the fenfluramine supplied by PCCA to Stewart's 
was determined to be defective. After plaintiff settled with PCCA, plaintiffs claims against 
PCCA were, by stipulation, dismissed by the court. The Cross-Claim of Stewart's against PCCA 
was not dismissed. 
8. Neither in her Memorandum in Opposition to Stewart's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, nor at oral argument, did plaintiff contest the validity of the provision of the 
PCCA Release which is quoted herein. No evidence was submitted to the court to suggest that 
the terms of the PCCA Release should not be enforced according to the ordinary meaning of its 
plain and unambiguous terms. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The court hereby adopts the following conclusions of law: 
1. The court hereby incorporates all conclusions of law set forth in the court's 
Orders of September 1,2000, denying Stewart's Motion for Summary Judgment, and October 18, 
2000, granting partial summary judgment to Stewart's. 
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2. The pertinent provision of the PCCA Release is unambiguous and 
enforceable according to its plain terms. Pursuant to the terms of the Release, plaintiff agreed to 
waive any right to recovery from any party that obtained a judgment of indemnification against 
PCCA. Therefore, if Stewart's is entitled in this matter to indemnification from PCCA for 
damages awarded to the plaintiff, then plaintiff has agreed to waive her right to recover from 
Stewart's. 
3. In Utah, each entity in the chain of distribution of a defective product is 
entitled to obtain indemnification from those supplying the defective product, provided the 
indemnitee did not alter or modify the product in such a way as to increase its dangerous qualities 
or to introduce the defect.1 Resolving every reasonable inference in plaintiffs favor, no evidence 
has been submitted to the court to establish that Stewart's in any way altered or increased the 
danger of the fenfluramine supplied to it by PCCA before it was consumed by the plaintiff. The 
court finds that as a matter of law Stewart's would be entitled to indemnification fronrPCCA for 
any defect in the drug fenfluramine which was consumed by the plaintiff. 
4. The court rejects plaintiffs argument that the enactment of the Utah 
Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-37, 38 (199.9) eliminated indemnification as 
it applies in this case to PCCA and Stewart's in the context of a strict product liability claim. 
lSee Hanover Ltd v. Cissna, 758 P.2d 443,445-446 (Utah App. 1988); National Serv. Indus. V. 
D. W. Norton, 937 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1997). This also appears to be the law in the majority of the 
states. Hanover, 758 P.2d at 446; Roland Truck v. Everwear, 468 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1985). 
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5. Having determined that Stewart's is entitled as a matter of law to judgment 
against PCCA for indemnity for damages awarded to Jeanne Schaerrer as a result of her 
remaining strict product liability claims, the court further finds that pursuant to the terms of the 
PCCA Release, plaintiff would inevitably be required to waive her right to recover from Stewart's 
any damages arising from a defect in the drug fenfluramine. The court determines that requiring 
Stewart's and the plaintiff to conduct a long and expensive trial would be wasteful and inefficient 
and would inevitably, if the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining a favorable verdict, result in plaintiff 
waiving her right to recover from Stewart's. Therefore, the court grants summary judgment in 
Stewart's favor, dismissing plaintiff's only remaining claim, that of strict product liability, with 
prejudice and on the merits, each party to bear their owns costs and attorneys' fees. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Having considered the arguments of the parties, and having entered findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Stewart's 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed on or about November 29, 2000, is granted, and plaintiffs 
7 
Complaint against Stewart's is dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits, each party to bear 
their own costs and attorneys' fees. 
DATED this 5£> day of / f W \ A^ j2£Lsi*v, 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, LLP, 
Richard M. Franco 
Attorneys Plaintiff Jeanne Schaerrer 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 1 ^ day of \c6fcu.s &j( 2001, to the 
following: 
Charles F. Abbott 
Scott Walker 
ABBOTT & WALKER 
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Craig N. Hentschel 
Michael H. Walizer 
ARNOLD & PORTER 
777 Figueroa St, 44* 
Los Angeles, CA 90017-5844 
Richard Heimann 
Richard M. Franco 
LEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN 
Embarcadero Center West 
275 Battery Street, 30th Floor 
San Francisco, California 94111-3339 
Telephone (415) 956-1000 
Dennis C. Ferguson 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Camille N. Johnson 
Brian P. Miller 
SNOW, CHRETENSEN & MARTTNEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
6724-1368 
342223 
3>cjuu— 
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